Policy brief written by Tristan Martin, student in the Master's program in International Studies, specializing in International Security with thesis at ESEI (Université Laval).
Subject: To what extent do institutional, geopolitical and cultural dynamics explain the divergence in Russian attitudes towards the Arctic Council and the Euro-Barents Council?
In September 2023, Russia officially withdrew from the Euro-Barents Council after 30 years of cooperation with its European neighbors (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland). This withdrawal follows the suspension of activities including Russia by these latter members. The suspension of activities follows the same logic as that declared by the seven members of the Arctic Council (AC). However, Russia's reaction is different, as it has not withdrawn from the AC; it has merely withdrawn its funding. The aim of this briefing note is therefore to propose potential interpretations of this choice: are these questions of institutional differences, does Russia wish to send a particular message, and how should Canada interpret Russian diplomatic actions?
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INTRODUCTION
This policy brief analyzes Russia's participation in key international Arctic institutions since the breakdown in Russian-Western relations caused by its invasion of Ukraine. More specifically, it compares two institutions - the Arctic Council (hereafter, CA) and the Euro-Barents Council (hereafter, CEB) - in which Western members have adopted a similar diplomatic approach, to which their Russian counterparts have responded with divergent approaches in each of these institutions.
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- February 24, 2022: Russia begins its invasion of Ukraine.
- March 3, 2022: The seven AC member states pause their participation in the forum chaired by Russia since May 2021.
- March 9, 2022: The five Western states and the European Commission (CEB members) suspend their activities involving Russia within the CEB.
- May 11, 2023: Norway succeeds Russia as chair of the BEC.
- September 18, 2023: Russia announces its withdrawal from the BEC, having assumed the presidency in October 2023.
- February 14, 2024: Russia announces the suspension of its annual financial contribution to the BEC until its activities are resumed.
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
It is possible that certain features of the CA's institutional architecture have enabled it to survive in relative terms to its counterpart. Several researchers have praised the resilience of this institution, as it has remained an exceptional space for Russian-Western cooperation despite Russian interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014). Hypotheses put forward to explain this exceptionalism include complex interdependence within the organization, a lack of hierarchy, the inclusion of transnational indigenous groups, the absence of military security issues in discussions and the non-binding nature of the GC (Byers, 2017; Lackenbauer & Dean, 2020). Of these five characteristics put forward to explain the GC's resilience in the face of previous international crises, it can be argued that the BEC shares four of them, bearing in mind a few important nuances. The two institutions share a similar mode of operation, characterized by a non-binding, non-hierarchical decision-making process. In the words of Alexander Wendt, “anarchy [in this case, the CA and CEB] is what states make of it” (Zavadskaya, 2014).
The BEC includes an institution with a regional dimension - the Barents Regional Council (hereafter, BRC) - within which several local indigenous groups express themselves. This operation diverges from that of the BRC insofar as these groups are formed from intra-national rather than transnational territories. This particularity could nevertheless be advantageous for Russia, since it is generally accepted that it practices strong control over its representatives on the BRC compared with its Scandinavian counterparts (Zavadskaya, 2014: p.77). At the “level” equivalent to the BOD - the permanent participants - Russia does not exert as much influence over the indigenous organization occupying its territory, indeed it had tried unsuccessfully to exclude it from meetings in 2012 (Chater, 2019).
Finally, there is little discussion of safety issues within the CEB, at least in the hard sense of the term. Like the Ottawa Declaration (1996), the Kirkenes Declaration (1993) places great emphasis on environmental protection. The ensuing priorities include economic and scientific cooperation, regional infrastructure development and the protection of indigenous peoples' rights (Barents Euro-Arctic Council, 1993). The interdependence formed from these founding principles seems to have been gradually eroded by the increasingly divergent interests of Russia and the other members. Indeed, only two years old when it joined the CEB, the Russian Federation was particularly attracted by the economic benefits of cooperation with its neighbors, specifically the development of road infrastructure and the attraction of investors for the exploitation of natural resources in the region (Zavadskaya, 2014: p.51).
Twenty years later, a Kirkenes 2.0 declaration is adopted, in a region that has changed a great deal. The CEB's attitude towards the environment now sees environmental protection as a necessary condition for economic and tourism development, rather than an area of cooperation in itself (ibid, p.43). Russia has recovered from difficult years and is taking a tougher line with the West, while a new player has emerged in the Arctic: China. Russia is no longer as dependent on its neighbors in the Barents region, and its economic interests are increasingly divergent from those of its neighbors: it is focusing on hydrocarbons, drawing closer to China, and a year later, annexing Crimea, thus reducing the flow of Western capital to its projects. On the BoD side, interdependence between member states seems stronger, but for geopolitical rather than institutional reasons.
GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS
From a geopolitical point of view, the differences between the CA and the CEB are obvious when we consult their lists of member states. For a start, the territory occupied by CA members is considerably larger than that occupied by CEB members. This territory is not only larger, but also more northerly and more disputed. Logically, its strategic importance is certainly greater than that of the Barents Sea. With this in mind, there are a number of features specific to the Arctic that are conducive to cooperation in the region. Firstly, the geographical and climatic conditions of the Arctic Sea make navigation - and possibly the exploitation of its resources - particularly difficult. Cooperation between Arctic states can thus serve to mitigate risks (Byers, 2019). Also, the growing interest of non-Arctic states in the region is an important factor; AC member states benefit from cooperating and defining common borders and standards to limit the influence of external actors (Yang, 2016). These characteristics are also considered in the governance of the Barents Sea, but to a lesser extent.
Secondly, another interesting hypothesis emerges from the very composition of the member states. All BEC members are members of the BOD with the exception of the European Commission (hereafter, EC), which was denied an observer seat on the BOD in 2013. In light of the sanctions imposed by the EC, it is possible that Russia is simply no longer willing to collaborate with it. It is also conceivable that withdrawing from the BEC could be a way of depriving the European Union of any platform for Arctic governance. And yet, if Russia were to rejoin the BSC in full, it would have to cooperate with several European members: Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
Finally, it's time to consider the player that would suffer the most losses from Russia's withdrawal from the BEC: Norway. Indeed, Norway is considered the cornerstone of the BEC and the most active member state, hosting the secretariat, bearing 2/3 of its costs and benefiting from this cooperation in many ways. Moreover, a discourse analysis shows that Norway was strongly committed to its relationship with Russia through this forum (Zavadskaya, 2014: p.44). Thus, withdrawing from the CEB could be a way for Russia to punish Norway for its strongly vocalized support for Finnish and Swedish membership of NATO, not to mention the fact that the organization's Secretary General was of Norwegian nationality until quite recently.
CULTURAL AND EMOTIONAL FACTORS
The pre-eminent role of the Arctic in Russian identity is no secret. From the Stalinist era to the present day, the Arctic has been a founding element of Russia's political and cultural identity (Emmerson, 2011: p.34). It was even a Russian initiative that gave rise to cooperation in the Arctic, through Gorbachev's famous speech in 1987. Identity politics in Russia continue to present the Arctic as a territory embodying Russian perseverance and heroism (Lackenbauer & Dean, 2020: p.338). Given this strong symbolism, Russian foreign policy may simply not be ready to turn its back on international Arctic governance for good. Moreover, this is a region where the Russians stand out; their Arctic region is well developed, and they enjoy considerable advantages in terms of navigation and technological equipment. The Arctic thus represents, to a certain extent, their last opportunity for territorial conquest or domination to compensate for the losses caused by the collapse of the USSR - and even by the subsequent expansion of NATO (ibid).
Finally, a hypothesis that is as interesting as it is difficult to confirm lies in an analysis of the personality of Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov. One of the few people close to Vladimir Putin to have been in office since the latter's first presidency, Lavrov is portrayed as a strategic diplomat with a complex and sophisticated understanding of the issues at stake, and is likely to have a strong influence on his President (Jackson, 2007).
Lavrov has, of course, been known to cause a great deal of grief since taking office in 2004. However, several sources report his dedication to multilateralism and respect for international rules. Under Medvedev between 2008 and 2012, he seemed to adopt a more liberal approach than he was allowed to under Putin, as he voted against anti-American legislation in the Duma (April, 2016). What's more, he is credited with opposing the annexation of Crimea in 2014, anticipating Western reactions (Bermann, 2024) and even campaigning to prevent escalation of the conflict once it had begun (Pavlovsky, 2016). All in all, even if he maintains a strong competitive spirit with the West, several experts point out that his speeches are tinged with a desire for cooperation rather than confrontation, particularly in the Arctic (Staun, 2017).
Indeed, Lavrov is a long-standing supporter of the AC. At a meeting in 2008, Lavrov reportedly complimented the work of the AC, promising to “further strengthen scientific cooperation with all our neighbors on the basis of rules that are part of the Law of the Sea” (Pedersen, 2012: p.10). In September 2023, Lavrov used language revealing his disappointment in announcing Russia's withdrawal from the CEB; he said he was obliged to take this decision in the light of circumstances (Edvardsen, 2023). The possibility that Lavrov personally convinced his leader of the importance of the BSC and of relations with the West in the Arctic cannot therefore be ruled out.
CONCLUSION
Russia's recent diplomatic moves in Arctic institutions raise important international security concerns, with crucial implications for Canada. While Russia is withdrawing from the CEB, its continued membership of the CA reveals a complex strategy, combining confrontation and cooperation. For Canada, the situation calls for heightened vigilance, as the Arctic is at the crossroads of geopolitical, climatic and security issues. Indeed, human security issues, such as the protection of indigenous populations and sustainable economic development, risk taking second place to geopolitical concerns. For Canada, which shares a vast Arctic territory with Russia, this represents a major challenge.
Russia's decision to withdraw funding from the AC is certainly a form of coercive diplomacy. When the Russian ambassador to the Arctic made the announcement, he left the door open to a return of funding conditional on the delegation's return to the Board's work. However, the CEB's withdrawal appears to be definitive. Is this particular choice the result of obligations or of a real desire? All in all, it's hard to decipher the real intentions of Russia's leaders at a time when the relationship of trust in Russian-Western relations has been definitively broken since February 24, 2022. However, it has to be said that Russia has not reached out for a return to cooperation in many areas since its invasion. The CA and CEB have played an important role in building Russian-Western relations since the end of the Cold War. It is therefore important to keep a pragmatic eye on the Arctic, and to understand what makes the CA an effective vehicle for cooperation with Russia.
In the face of these uncertainties, Canada must adopt a nuanced, proactive approach. This means maintaining open channels of communication with Russia within the framework of the AC, while strengthening alliances with other Arctic states to ensure that climate and human security issues remain at the heart of international discussions. Arctic cooperation could yet represent a rare space for dialogue with Russia, but only if all parties manage to temper geopolitical tensions in favor of sustainable governance of this fragile region.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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